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Abstract
We study algorithms for online linear optimization in Hilbert spaces, focusing on
the case where the player is unconstrained. We develop a novel characterization
of a large class of minimax algorithms, recovering, and even improving, several
previous results as immediate corollaries. Moreover, using our tools, we develop
an algorithm that provides a regret bound of O
(
U
√
T log(U
√
T log2 T + 1)
)
,
where U is the L2 norm of an arbitrary comparator and both T and U are unknown
to the player. This bound is optimal up to
√
log log T terms. When T is known,
we derive an algorithm with an optimal regret bound (up to constant factors). For
both the known and unknown T case, a Normal approximation to the conditional
value of the game proves to be the key analysis tool.
1 Introduction
The online learning framework provides a scalable and flexible approach for modeling a wide
range of prediction problems, including classification, regression, ranking, and portfolio management.
Online algorithms work in rounds, where at each round a new instance is given and the algorithm
makes a prediction. Then the environment reveals the label of the instance, and the learning algorithm
updates its internal hypothesis. The aim of the learner is to minimize the cumulative loss it suffers due
to its prediction error.
Research in this area has mainly focused on designing new prediction strategies and proving theo-
retical guarantees for them. However, recently, minimax analysis has been proposed as a general tool
to design optimal prediction strategies [Rakhlin et al., 2012, 2013, McMahan and Abernethy, 2013].
The problem is cast as a sequential multi-stage zero-sum game between the player (the learner) and an
adversary (the environment), providing the optimal strategies for both. In some cases the value of the
game can be calculated exactly in an efficient way [Abernethy et al., 2008a], in others upper bounds
on the value of the game (often based on the sequential Rademacher complexity) are used to construct
efficient algorithms with theoretical guarantees [Rakhlin et al., 2012].
While most of the work in this area has focused on the setting where the player is constrained to a
bounded convex set [Abernethy et al., 2008a] (with the notable exception of McMahan and Abernethy
[2013]), in this work we are interested in the general setting of unconstrained online learning with
∗Both authors thank Jacob Abernethy for insightful feedback on this work.
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linear losses in Hilbert spaces. In Section 4, extending the work of McMahan and Abernethy [2013],
we provide novel and general sufficient conditions to be able to compute the exact minimax strategy
for both the player and the adversary, as well as the value of the game. In particular, we show that
under these conditions the optimal play of the adversary is always orthogonal or always parallel to
the sum of his previous plays, while the optimal play of the player is always parallel. On the other
hand, for some cases where the exact minimax strategy is hard to characterize, we introduce a new
relaxation procedure based on a Normal approximation. In the particular application of interest, we
show the relaxation is strong enough to yield an optimal regret bound, up to constant factors.
In Section 5, we use our new tools to recover and extend previous results on minimax strategies
for linear online learning, including results for bounded domains. In fact, we show how to obtain a
family of minimax strategies that smoothly interpolates between the minimax algorithm for a bounded
feasible set and a minimax optimal algorithm in fact equivalent to unconstrained gradient descent. We
emphasize that all the algorithms from this family are exactly minimax optimal,1 in a sense we will
make precise in the next section. Moreover, if you are allowed to play outside of the comparator set,
we show that some members of this family have a non-vacuous regret bound for the unconstrained
setting, while remaining optimal for the constrained one.
When studying unconstrained problems, a natural question is how small we can make the de-
pendence of the regret bound on U , the L2 norm of an arbitrary comparator point, while still main-
taining a
√
T dependency on the time horizon. The best algorithm from the above family achieves
Regret(U) ≤ 12 (U2 + 1)
√
T . Streeter and McMahan [2012] and Orabona [2013] show it is possible
to reduce the dependence on U to O(U logUT ). In order to improve on this, in Section 6 we apply
our techniques to analyze a strategy, based on a Normal potential function, that gives a regret bound
of O
(
U
√
T log(U
√
T log2 T + 1)
)
where U is the L2 norm of a comparator, and both T and U are
unknown. This bound is optimal up to
√
log logT terms. Moreover, when T is known, we propose an
algorithm based on a similar potential function that is optimal up to constant terms. This solves the
open problem posed in those papers, matching the lower bound for this problem. Table 1 summarizes
the regret bounds we prove, along with those for related algorithms.
Our analysis tools for both known-T and unknown horizon algorithms rest heavily on the relation-
ship between the reward (negative loss) achieved by the algorithm, potential functions that provide a
benchmark for the amount of reward the algorithm should have, the regret of the algorithm with re-
spect to a post-hoc comparator u, and the conditional value of the game. These are familiar concepts
from the literature, but we summarize these relationships and provide some modest generalizations in
Section 3.
2 Notation and Problem Formulation
Let H be a Hilbert space with inner product 〈·, ·〉. The associated norm is denoted by ‖ · ‖, i.e.
‖x‖ =
√
〈x, x〉. Given a closed and convex function f with domain S ⊆ H, we will denote its
Fenchel conjugate by f∗ : H → R where f∗(u) = supv∈S
(〈v, u〉 − f(v)).
We consider a version of online linear optimization, a standard game for studying repeated decision
making. On each of a sequence of rounds, a player chooses an action wt ∈ H, an adversary chooses
a linear cost function gt ∈ G ⊆ H, and the player suffers loss 〈wt, gt〉. For any sequence of plays
1In this work, we use the term “minimax” to refer to the exact minimax solution to the zero sum game, as opposed to
algorithms that only achieve the minimax optimal rate up to say constant factors.
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Regret bounds for known-T algorithms
(A) Minimax Regret √T for u ∈ W , O(T ) otherwise Abernethy et al. [2008a]
(B) OGD, fixed η 1
2
(1 + U2)
√
T E.g., Shalev-Shwartz [2012]
(C) pq-Algorithm ( 1
p
+ 1
q
Uq
)√
T Cor. 9, which also covers (A) and (B)
(D) Reward Doubling O(U√T log(d(U + 1)T )) Streeter and McMahan [2012]
(E) Normal Potential, ǫ = 1 O
(
U
√
T log
(
UT + 1
))
Theorem 11
(F) Normal Potential, ǫ = √T O
(
(U + 1)
√
T log(U + 1)
)
Theorem 11
Regret bounds for adaptive algorithms for unknown T
(G) Adaptive FTRL/RDA (1 + 1
2
U2)
√
T Shalev-Shwartz [2007], Xiao [2009]
(H) Dim. Free Exp. Grad. O(U√T log(UT + 1)) Orabona [2013]
(I) AdaptiveNormal O∗
(
U
√
T log
(
UT + 1
))
Theorem 12
Table 1: Summary of regret bounds for unconstrained linear optimization. Here U = ‖u‖ is the norm
of a comparator, with U unknown to the algorithm. We let W = {w : ‖w‖ ≤ 1}; the adversary
plays gradients with ‖gt‖ ≤ 1. (A) is minimax optimal for regret against points in W , and always
plays points from W . The other algorithms are unconstrained. Even though (A) is minimax optimal
for regret, other algorithms (e.g. (B)) offer strictly better bounds for arbitrary U . (C) corresponds to a
family of minimax optimal algorithms where 1p +
1
q = 1; p = 2 yields (B) and as p→ 1 the algorithm
becomes (A); Corollary 9 covers (A) exactly. Only (D) has a dependence on d, the dimension of H.
The O∗ in (I) hides an additional log2(T + 1) term inside the log.
w1, . . . wT and g1, . . . , gT , we define the regret against a comparator u in the standard way:
Regret(u) ≡
T∑
t=1
〈gt, wt − u〉 .
This setting is general enough to cover the cases of online learning in, for example, Rd, in the vector
space of matrices, and in a RKHS. We also define the reward of the algorithm, which is the earnings
(or negative losses) of the player throughout the game:
Reward ≡
T∑
t=1
〈−gt, wt〉 .
We write θt ≡ −g1:t, where we use the compressed summation notation g1:t ≡
∑T
s=1 gs.
The Minimax View It will be useful to consider a full game-theoretic characterization of the above
interaction when the number of rounds T is known to both players. This approach that has received
significant recent interest [Abernethy et al., 2008a, 2007, Abernethy and Warmuth, 2010, Abernethy
et al., 2008b, Streeter and McMahan, 2012].
In the constrained setting, where the comparator vector u ∈ W , we have that the value of the game,
3
that is the regret when both the player and the adversary play optimally, is
V ≡ min
w1∈H
max
g1∈G
· · · min
wT∈H
max
gT∈G
(
sup
u∈W
T∑
t=1
〈wt − u, gt〉
)
= min
w1∈H
max
g1∈G
· · · min
wT∈H
max
gT∈G
(
T∑
t=1
〈wt, gt〉+ sup
u∈W
〈u, θT 〉
)
= min
w1∈H
max
g1∈G
· · · min
wT∈H
max
gT∈G
(
T∑
t=1
〈wt, gt〉+B(θT )
)
,
where
B(θ) = sup
w∈W
〈w, θ〉 . (1)
Following McMahan and Abernethy [2013], we generalize the game in terms of a generic convex
benchmark function B : H → R, instead of using the definition (1). This allows us to analyze the
constrained and unconstrained setting in a unified way. Hence, the value of the game is the difference
between the benchmark reward B(θT ) and the actual reward achieved by the player (under optimal
play by both parties). Intuitively, viewing the units of loss/reward as dollars, V is the amount of
starting capital we need (equivalently, the amount we need to borrow) to ensure we end the game with
B(θT ) dollars. The motivation for defining the game in terms of an arbitrary B is made clear in the
next section: It will allow us to derive Regret bounds in terms of the Fenchel conjugate of B.
We define inductively the conditional value of the game after g1, . . . , gt have been played by
Vt(θt) = min
w∈H
max
g∈G
(〈g, w〉+ Vt+1(θt − g)) with VT (θT ) = B(θT ) .
Thus, we can view the notation V for the value of the game as shorthand for V0(0). Under minimax
play by both players, unrolling the previous equality, we have
∑t
s=1〈gs, ws〉+ Vt(−g1:t) = V, or for
t = T ,
Reward =
T∑
t=1
〈−gt, wt〉 = B(θT )− V . (2)
We also have that, given the conditional value of the game, a minimax-optimal strategy is
wt+1 = argmin
w
max
g∈G
〈g, w〉+ Vt+1(θt − g) . (3)
McMahan and Abernethy [2013, Cor. 2] showed that in the unconstrained case, Vt is a smoothed
version of B, where the smoothing comes from an expectation over future plays of the adversary. In
this work, we show that in some cases (Theorem 4) we can find a closed form for Vt in terms of B,
and in fact the solution to (3) will simply be the gradient of Vt, or equivalently, an FTRL algorithm
with regularizer V ∗t . On the other hand, to derive our main results, we face a case (Theorem 6) where
Vt is generally not expressible in closed form, and the resulting algorithm does not look like FTRL.
We solve the first problem by using a Normal approximation to the adversary’s future moves, and we
solve the second by showing (3) can still be solved in closed form with respect to this approximation
to Vt.
3 Potential Functions and the Duality of Reward and Regret
In the present section we will review some existing results in online learning theory as well as provide
a number of mild generalizations for our purposes. Potential functions play a major role in the design
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and analysis of online learning algorithms [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]. We will use q : H → R
to describe the potential, and the key assumptions are that q should depend solely on the cumulative
gradients g1:T and that q is convex in this argument.2 Since our aim is adaptive algorithms, we often
look at a sequence of changing potential functions q1, . . . , qT , each of which takes as argument−g1:t
and is convex. These functions have appeared with different interpretations in many papers, with
different emphasis. They can be viewed as 1) the conjugate of an (implicit) time-varying regularizer
in a Mirror Descent or Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006, Shalev-Shwartz, 2007, Rakhlin, 2009], 2) as proxy for the conditional value of the game in a
minimax setting [Rakhlin et al., 2012], or 3) a potential giving a bound on the amount of reward we
want the algorithm to have obtained at the end of round t [Streeter and McMahan, 2012, McMahan
and Abernethy, 2013].
These views are of course closely connected, but can lead to somewhat different analysis tech-
niques. Following the last view, suppose we interpret qt(θt) as the desired reward at the end of round
t, given the adversary has played θt = −g1:t so far. Then, if we can bound our actual final reward in
terms of qT (θT ), we also immediately get a regret bound stated in terms of the Fenchel conjugate q∗T .
Generalizing Streeter and McMahan [2012, Thm. 1], we have the following result (all omitted proofs
can be found in the Appendix).
Theorem 1. Let Ψ : H → R be a convex function. An algorithm for the player guarantees
Reward ≥ Ψ(−g1:T )− ǫˆ for any g1, . . . , gT (4)
for a constant ǫˆ ∈ R if and only if it guarantees
Regret(u) ≤ Ψ∗(u) + ǫˆ for all u ∈ H . (5)
First we consider the minimax setting, where we define the game in terms of a convex benchmark
B. Then, (2) gives us an immediate lower bound on the reward of the minimax strategy for the player
(against any adversary), and so applying Theorem 1 with Ψ = B gives
∀u ∈ H, Regret(u) ≤ B∗(u) + V . (6)
The fundamental point, of which we will make much use, is this: even if one only cares about the
traditional definition of regret, the study of the minimax game defined in terms of a general compara-
tor benchmark B may be interesting, as the minimax algorithm for the player may then give novel
bounds on regret. Note when B is defined as in (1), the theorem implies ∀u ∈ W , Regret(u) ≤ V .
More generally, even for non-minimax algorithms, Theorem 1 states that understanding the reward
(equivalently, loss) of an algorithm as a function of the sum of gradients chosen by the adversary is
both necessary and sufficient for understanding the regret of the algorithm.
Now we consider the potential function view. The following general bound for any sequence
of plays wt against gradients gt, for an arbitrary sequence of potential functions qt, has been used
numerous times (see Orabona [2013, Lemma 1] and references therein). The claim is that
Regret(u) ≤ q∗T (u) +
T∑
t=1
(qt(θt)− qt−1(θt−1) + 〈wt, gt〉) , (7)
where we take θ0 = ~0, and assume q0(~0) = 0. In fact, this statement is essentially equivalent to the
argument of (4) and (5). For intuition, we can view qt(θt) as the amount of money we wish to have
available at the end of round t. Suppose at the end of each round t, we borrow an additional sum ǫt
2It is sometimes possible to generalize to potentials qt(g1, . . . , gt) that are functions of each gradient individually.
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as needed to ensure we actually have qt(θt) on hand. Then, based on this invariant, the amount of
reward we actually have after playing on round t is qt−1(θt−1) + 〈wt,−gt〉, the money we had at the
beginning of the round, plus the reward we get for playing wt. Thus, the additional amount we need
to borrow at the end of round t in order to maintain the invariant is exactly
ǫt(θt−1, gt) ≡ qt(θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reward desired
− (qt−1(θt−1) + 〈wt,−gt〉)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reward achieved
, (8)
recalling θt = θt−1 − gt. Thus, if we can find bounds ǫˆt such that for all t, θt−1, and g ∈ G,
ǫˆt ≥ ǫt(θt−1, gt) (9)
we can re-state (7) as exactly (5) with Ψ = qT and ǫˆ = ǫˆ1:T . Further, solving (8) for the per-round
reward 〈wt,−gt〉, summing from t = 1 to T and canceling telescoping terms gives exactly (4). Not
surprisingly, both Theorem 1 and (7) can be proved in terms of the Fenchel-Young inequality.
When T is known, and the qt are chosen carefully, it is possible to obtain ǫˆt = 0. On the other
hand, when T is unknown to the players, typically we will need bounds ǫˆt > 0. For example, in both
Streeter and McMahan [2012, Thm. 6] and Orabona [2013], the key is showing the sum of these ǫˆt
terms is always bounded by a constant. For completeness, we also state standard results where we
interpret q∗t as a regularizer.
The conjugate regularizer and Bregman divergences The updates of many algorithms are based
on a time-varying version of the FTRL strategy,
wt+1 = ∇qt(θt) = argmin
w
〈g1:t, w〉 + q∗t (w), (10)
where we view q∗t as a time-varying regularizer (see Orabona et al. [2013] and references therein).
Regret bounds can be easily obtained using (7) when the regularizers q∗t (w) are increasing with t, and
they are strongly convex w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖∗, using the fact that the potential functions qt will be
strongly smooth. Then strong smoothness and particular choice of wt implies
qt−1(θt) ≤ qt−1(θt−1)− 〈wt, gt〉+ 1
2
‖gt‖2, (11)
which leads to the bound
ǫt(θt, gt) = qt(θt)− qt−1(θt−1) + 〈wt, gt〉 ≤ qt(θt)− qt−1(θt) + 1
2
‖gt‖2 ≤ 1
2
‖gt‖2,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that if f(x) ≤ g(x), then f∗(y) ≥ g∗(y) (immediate
from the definition of the conjugate).
When the regularizer q∗ is fixed, that is, qt = q for all t for some convex function q, we get the
approach pioneered by Grove et al. [2001] and Kivinen and Warmuth [2001]:
ǫt(θt, gt) = q(θt)− q(θt−1) + 〈wt, gt〉 = q(θt)−
(
q(θt−1) + 〈∇q(θt−1), gt〉
)
= Dq(θt, θt−1),
where Dq is the Bregman Divergence with respect to q, and we predict with wt = ∇q(θt−1).
Admissible relaxations and potentials We extend the notion of relaxations of the conditional value
of the game of Rakhlin et al. [2012] to the present setting. We say vt with corresponding strategy wt
is a relaxation of Vt if
∀θ, vT (θ) ≥ B(θ) and (12)
∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, g ∈ G, θ ∈ H, vt(θ) + ǫˆt+1 ≥ 〈g, wt+1〉+ vt+1(θ − g), (13)
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for constants ǫˆt ≥ 0. This definition matches Eq. (4) of Rakhlin et al. [2012] if we force all ǫˆt = 0, but
if we allow some slack ǫˆt, (13) corresponds exactly to (8) and (9).
Note that (13) is invariant to adding a constant to all vt. In particular, given an admissible vt, we
can define qt(θ) = vt(θ)− v0(~0) so qt(~0) = 0 and q satisfies (9) with the same ǫˆt values for which vt
satisfies (13). Or we could define q0(~0) = 0 and qt(θ) = vt(θ) for t ≥ 1, and take ǫˆ1 ← ǫˆ1+ v0(~0) (or
any other way of distributing the v0(~0) into the ǫˆ). Generally, when T is known we will find working
with admissible relaxations vt to be most useful, while for unknown horizons T , potential functions
with q0(~0) = 0 will be more natural.
For our admissible relaxations, we have a result that closely mirrors Theorem 1:
Corollary 2. Let v0, . . . , vT be an admissible relaxation for a benchmark B. Then, for any sequence
g1, . . . , gT , for any wt chosen so (13) and (12) are satisfied, we have
Reward ≥ B(θT )− v0(0)− ǫˆ1:T and Regret(u) ≤ B∗(u) + v0(0) + ǫˆ1:T .
Proof. For the first statement, re-arranging and summing (13) shows Rewardt ≥ vt(θt)− ǫˆ1:t− v0(0)
and so final Reward ≥ B(θ)− v0(0)− ǫˆ1:T ; the second result then follows from Theorem 1.
The regret bound corresponds to (6); in particular, if we take vt to be the conditional value of the
game, then (12) and (13) hold with equality with all ǫˆt = 0. Note if we define B as in (1), the regret
guarantee becomes ∀u ∈ W , Regret(u) ≤ v0(0) + ǫˆ1:T , analogous to [Rakhlin et al., 2012, Prop. 1]
when ǫˆ1:T = 0.
Deriving algorithms Consider an admissible relaxation vt. Given the form of the regret bounds we
have proved, a natural strategy is to choose wt+1 so as to minimize ǫˆt+1, that is,
wt+1 = argmin
w
max
g∈G
vt+1(θt − g)− vt(θt) + 〈g, w〉 = argmin
w
max
g∈G
〈g, w〉+ vt+1(θt − g), (14)
following Rakhlin et al. [2012, Eq. (5)], Rakhlin et al. [2013], and Streeter and McMahan [2012,
Eq. (8)]. We see that vt+1 is standing in for the conditional value of the game in (3). Since additive
constants do not impact the argmin, we could also replace vt with a potential qt, say qt(θ) = vt(θ) −
v0(0).
4 Minimax Analysis Approaches for Known-Horizon Games
In general, the problem of calculating the conditional value of a game Vt(θ) is hard. And even for a
known potential, deriving an optimal solution via (14) is also in general a hard problem. When the
player is unconstrained, we can simplify the computation of Vt and the derivation of optimal strategies.
For example, following ideas from McMahan and Abernethy [2013],
ǫt(θt) = max
p∈∆(G),Eg∼p[g]=0
E
g∼p
[qt+1(θt − g)]− qt(θt),
where ∆(G) is the set of probability distributions on G. McMahan and Abernethy [2013] shows that
in some cases is possible to easily calculate this maximum, in particular when G = [−G,G]d and
qt decomposes on a per-coordinate spaces (that is, when the problem is essentially d independent,
one-dimensional problems).
In this section we will state two quite general cases where we can obtain the exact value of the
game, even though the problem does not decompose on a per coordinate basis. Note that in both cases
the optimal strategy for wt+1 will be in the direction of θt.
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We study the game when the horizon T is known, with a benchmark function of the form B(θ) =
f(‖θ‖) for an increasing convex function f : [0,+∞] → R (which ensures B is convex). Note this
form for B is particularly natural given our desire to prove results that hold for general Hilbert spaces.
We will then be able to derive regret bounds using Theorem 1, and the following technical lemma:
Lemma 3. Let B(θ) = f(‖θ‖) for f : R→ (−∞,+∞] even. Then, B∗(u) = f∗(‖u‖).
Recall that f is even if f(x) = f(−x). Our key tool will be a careful study of the one-round
version of this game. For this section, we let h :R → R be an even convex function that is increasing
on [0,∞], G = {g : ‖g‖ ≤ G}, and d the dimension of H. We consider the one-round game
H ≡ min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ h(‖θ − g‖) , (15)
where θ ∈ H is a fixed parameter. For results regarding this game, we let H(w, g) = 〈w, g〉 +
h(‖θ − g‖), w∗ = argminwmaxg∈G H(w, g), and g∗ = argmaxg∈G H(w∗, g). Also, let θˆ = θ‖θ‖ if
‖θ‖ 6= 0, and ~0 otherwise.
4.1 The case of the orthogonal adversary
Let B(θ) = f(‖θ‖) for an increasing convex function f : [0,∞]→ R, and define
ft(x) = f(
√
x2 +G2(T − t)) .
Note that ft(‖θ‖) can be viewed as a smoothed version of B(θ), since
√
‖θ‖2 + C is a smoothed
version of ‖θ‖ for a constant C > 0. Moreover, f0(‖θ‖) = B(θ).
Our first key result is the following:
Theorem 4. Let the adversary play from G = {g : ‖g‖ ≤ G} and assume all the ft satisfy
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ ft+1(‖θ − g‖) = ft+1
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
. (16)
Then the value of the game is f(G√T ), the conditional value is Vt(θ) = ft(‖θ‖) = ft+1(
√
‖θ‖2 +G2),
and the optimal strategy can be found using (14) on Vt.
Further, a sufficient condition for (16) is that d > 1, f is twice differentiable, and f ′′(x) ≤
f ′(x)/x, for all x > 0. In this case we also have that the minimax optimal strategy is
wt+1 = ∇Vt(θt) = θt f
′(
√
‖θt‖2 +G2(T − t))√
‖θt‖2 +G2(T − t)
. (17)
In this case, the minimax optimal strategy (20) is equivalent to the FTRL strategy in (10) with the
time varying regularizer V ∗t (w). The key lemma needed for the proof is the following:
Lemma 5. Consider the game of (15). Then, if d > 1, h is twice differentiable, and h′′(x) ≤ h′(x)xfor x > 0, we have:
H = h
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
and w∗ = θ√‖θ‖2 +G2h′
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
.
Any g∗ such that 〈θ, g∗〉 = 0 and ‖g∗‖ = G is a minimax play for the adversary.
We defer the proofs to the Appendix (of the proofs in the appendix, the proof of Lemmas 5 and 8
are perhaps the most important and instructive). Since the best response of the adversary is always to
play a g∗ orthogonal to θ, we call this the case of the orthogonal adversary.
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4.2 The case of the parallel adversary, and Normal approximations
We analyze a second case where (15) has closed-form solution, and hence derive a class of games
where we can cleanly state the value of the game and the minimax optimal strategy. The results
of McMahan and Abernethy [2013] can be viewed as a special case of the results in this section.
First, we introduce some notation. We write τ ≡ T − t when T and t are clear from context. We
write r ∼ {−1, 1} to indicate r is a Rademacher random variable, and rτ ∼ {−1, 1}τ to indicate rτ
is the sum of τ IID Rademacher random variables. Let σ =
√
π/2. We write φ for a random variable
with distribution N(0, σ2), and similarly define φτ ∼ N(0, (T − t)σ2). Then, define
ft(x) = E
rτ∼{−1,1}τ
[f (|x+ rτG|)] and fˆt(x) = E
φτ∼N(0,τσ2)
[f (|x+ φτG|)] , (18)
and note B(θ) = fT (‖θ‖) = fˆT (‖θ‖) since φ0 and r0 are always zero. These functions are exactly
smoothed version of the function f used to define B. With these definitions, we can now state:
Theorem 6. Let B(θ) = f(‖θ‖) for an increasing convex function f : [0,∞] → R, and let the
adversary play from G = {g : ‖g‖ ≤ G}. Assume ft and fˆt as in (18) for all t. If all the ft satisfy
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ ft+1(‖θ − g‖) = E
r∼{−1,1}
[
ft+1 (‖θ‖+ rG)
]
, (19)
then Vt(θ) = ft(‖θ‖) is exactly the conditional value of the game, and (14) gives the minimax optimal
strategy:
wt+1 = θˆ
ft+1 (‖θ‖+G)− ft+1 (‖θ‖ −G)
2G
. (20)
Similarly, suppose the fˆt satisfy the equality (19) (with fˆt replacing ft). Then qt(θ) = fˆt(‖θ‖) is an
admissible relaxation of Vt, satisfying (13) with ǫˆt = 0, using wt+1 based on (14). Further, a sufficient
condition for (19) is that d = 1, or d > 1, the ft (or fˆt, respectively) are twice differentiable, and
satisfy and f ′′t (x) ≥ f ′t(x)/x for all x > 0.
Contrary to the case of the orthogonal adversary, the strategy in (20) cannot easily be interpreted as
an FTRL algorithm. The proof is based on two lemmas. The first provides the key tool in supporting
the Normal relaxation:
Lemma 7. Let f : R→ R be a convex function and σ2 = π/2. Then,
E
g∼{−1,1}
[f(g)] ≤ E
φ∼N(0,σ2)
[f(φ)] .
Proof. First observe that E[(φ − 1)1{φ > 0}] = 0 and E[(φ + 1)1{φ < 0}] = 0 by our choice of σ.
We will use two lower bounds on the function f , which follow from convexity:
f(x) ≥ f(1) + f ′(1)(x− 1) and f(x) ≥ f(−1) + f ′(−1)(x+ 1) .
Writing out the value of E[f(φ)] explicitly we have
E[f(φ)] = E[f(φ)1{φ < 0}] + E[f(φ)1{φ > 0}]
≥ E[(f(−1) + f ′(−1)(φ+ 1))1{φ < 0}] + E[(f(1) + f ′(1)(φ− 1))1{φ > 0}]
=
f(−1) + f(1)
2
+ f ′(−1)E[(φ+ 1)1{φ < 0}] + f ′(1)E[(φ − 1)1{φ < 0}] .
The latter two terms vanish, giving the stated inequality.
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The second lemma is used to prove the sufficient condition by solving the one-round game; again,
the proof is deferred to the Appendix. Note that functions of the form h(x) = g(x2), with g convex
always satisfies the conditions of the following Lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider the game of (15). Then, if d = 1, or if d > 1, h is twice differentiable, and
h′′(x) > h
′(x)
x for x > 0, then
H =
h (‖θ‖+G) + h (‖θ‖ −G)
2
and w∗ = θˆ h (‖θ‖+G)− h (‖θ‖ −G)
2G
.
Any g∗ that satisfies |〈θ, g∗〉| = G‖θ‖ and ‖g∗‖ =G is a minimax play for the adversary.
The adversary can always play g∗ = G θ‖θ‖ when θ 6= 0, and so we describe this as the case of the
parallel adversary. In fact, inductively this means that all the adversary’s plays gt can be on the same
line, providing intuition for the fact that this lemma also applies in the 1-dimensional case.
Theorem 6 provides a recipe to produce suitable relaxations qt which may, in certain cases, exhibit
nice closed form solutions. The interpretation here is that a “Gaussian adversary” is stronger than one
playing from the set [−1, 1] which leads to IID Rademacher behavior, and this allows us to gener-
ate such potential functions via Gaussian smoothing. In this view, note that our choice of σ2 gives
Eφ[|φ|] = 1.
5 A Power Family of Minimax Algorithms
We analyze a family of algorithms based on potentials B(θ) = f(‖θ‖) where f(x) = Wp |x|p for
parameters W > 0 and p ∈ [1, 2], when the dimension is at least two. This is reminiscent of p-norm
algorithms [Gentile, 2003], but the connection is superficial—the norm we use to measure θ is always
the norm of our Hilbert space. Our main result is:
Corollary 9. Let d > 1 and W > 0, and let f and B be defined as above. Define ft(x) = Wp
(
x2 +
(T − t)G)p/2. Then, ft(‖θ‖) is the conditional value of the game, and the optimal strategy is as in
Theorem 4. If p ∈ (1, 2], letting q ≥ 2 such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1, we have a bound
Regret(u) ≤ 1
W q−1q
‖u‖q + W
p
(
G
√
T
)p ≤ ( 1p + 1q ‖u‖q)G√T ,
where the second inequality comes by takingW = (G
√
T )1−p. For all u, the bound
(
1
p+
1
q ‖u‖q
)
G
√
T
is minimized by taking p = 2. For p = 1, we have
∀u : ‖u‖ ≤W, Regret(u) ≤WG
√
T .
Proof. Let f(x) = Wp |x|p for p ∈ [1, 2], Then, f ′′(x) ≤ f ′(x)/x, in fact basic calculations show
f ′(x)/x
f ′′(x) =
1
p−1 ≥ 1 when p ≤ 2. Hence, we can apply Theorem 4, proving the claim on the ft. The
regret bounds can then be derived from Corollary 2, which gives Regret(u) ≤ f∗(u) + f(G√T ),
noting f∗(u) = Wq | uW |q when p > 1. The fact that p = 2 is an optimal choice in the first bound
follows from the fact that ddp
(
1
p +
1
q ‖u‖q
)
≤ 0 for p ∈ (1, 2] with q = pp−1 .
The p = 1 case in fact exactly recaptures the result of Abernethy et al. [2008a] for linear functions,
extending it also to spaces of dimension equal to two. The optimal update is wt+1 = ▽ft(‖θt‖) =
10
Wθt/
√
‖θt‖2 +G2(T − t). In addition to providing a regret bound for the comparator set W = {u :
‖u‖ ≤W}, the algorithm will in fact only play points from this set.
For p = q = 2, writing W = η, we have
Regret(u) ≤ 1
2η
‖u‖2 + η
2
G2T,
for any u. In this case we see W = η is behaving not like the radius of a comparator set, but rather as a
learning rate. In fact, we have wt+1 = ∇Vt(θt) = ηθt = −ηg1:t, and so we see this minimax-optimal
algorithm is in fact constant-step-size gradient descent. Taking η = 1
G
√
T
yields 12 (‖u‖2 + 1)G
√
T .
This result complements McMahan and Abernethy [2013, Thm. 7], which covers the d = 1 case, or
d > 1 when the adversary plays from G = [−1, 1]d.
Comparing the p = 1 and p > 1 algorithms reveals an interesting fact. For simplicity, take G = 1.
Then, the p = 1 algorithm with W = 1 is exactly the minimax optimal algorithm for minimizing regret
against comparators in the L2 ball (for d > 1): the value of this game is
√
T and we can do no better
(even by playing outside of the comparator set). However, picking p > 1 gives us algorithms that will
play outside of the comparator set. While they cannot do better than
√
T , taking G = 1 and ‖u‖ = 1
shows that all algorithms in this family in fact achieve Regret(u) ≤
√
T when ‖u‖ ≤ 1, matching the
exact minimax optimal value. Further, the algorithms with p > 1 provide much stronger guarantees,
since they also give non-vacuous guarantees for ‖u‖ > 1, and tighter bounds when ‖u‖ < 1. This
suggests that the p = 2 algorithm will be the most useful algorithm in practice, something that indeed
has been observed empirically (given the prevalence of gradient descent in real applications). This
result also clearly demonstrates the value of studying minimax-optimal algorithms for different choices
of the benchmark B, as this can produce algorithms that are no worse and in some cases significantly
better than minimax algorithms defined in terms of regret minimization directly (i.e., via (1)).
The key difference in these algorithms is not how they play against a minimax optimal adversary
for the regret game, but how they play against non-worst-case adversaries. In fact, a simple induction
based on Lemma 5 shows that any minimax-optimal adversary will play so that
√
‖θt‖2 +G2(T − t) =
G
√
T . Against such an adversary, the p = 1 algorithm is identical to the p = 2 algorithm with learning
rate η = 1
G
√
T
. In fact, using the choice of W from Corollary 9, all of these algorithms play identically
against a minimax adversary for the regret game.
6 Tight Bounds for Unconstrained Learning
In this section we analyze algorithms based on benchmarks and potentials of the form exp(‖θ‖2/t),
and show they lead to a minimal dependence on ‖u‖ in the corresponding regret bounds for a given
upper bound on regret against the origin (equal to the loss of the algorithm).
First, we derive a lower bound for the known T game. Using Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can
show that theB(θ) = exp(‖θ‖2/T ) benchmark approximately corresponds to a regularizer of the form
‖u‖
√
T log(
√
T‖u‖+ 1); there is actually some technical challenge here, as the conjugateB∗ cannot
be computed in closed form—the given regularizer is an upper bound. This kind of regularizer is par-
ticularly interesting because it is related to parameter-free sub-gradient descent algorithms [Orabona,
2013]; a similar potential function was used for a parameter-free algorithm by [Chaudhuri et al., 2009].
The lower bound for this game was proven in Streeter and McMahan [2012] for 1-dimensional spaces,
and Orabona [2013] extended it to Hilbert spaces and improved the leading constant. We report it here
for completeness.
Theorem 10. Fix a non-trivial Hilbert space H and a specific online learning algorithm. If the
algorithm guarantees a zero regret against the competitor with zero norm, then there exists a sequence
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of T cost vectors in H, such that the regret against any other competitor is Ω(T ). On the other hand,
if the algorithm guarantees a regret at most of ǫ > 0 against the competitor with zero norm, then, for
any 0 < η < 1, there exists a T0 and a sequence of T ≥ T0 unitary norm vectors gt ∈ H, and a vector
u ∈ H such that
Regret(u) ≥ (1 − η)‖u‖
√
1
log 2
√
T log
η‖u‖√T
3ǫ
− 2 .
6.1 Deriving a known-T algorithm with minimax rates via the Normal approx-
imation
Consider the game with fixed known T , an adversary that plays from G = {g ∈ H | ‖g‖ ≤ G}, and
B(θ) = ǫ exp
(‖θ‖2
2aT
)
,
for constants a > 1 and ǫ > 0. We will show that we are in the case of the parallel adversary,
Section 4.2. Both computing the ft based on Rademacher expectations and evaluating the sufficient
condition for those ft appear quite difficult, so we turn to the Normal approximation. We then have
fˆt(x) = E
φτ
[
ǫ exp
(
(x+ φτG)
2
2at
)]
= ǫ
(
1− πG
2(T − t)
2aT
)− 1
2
exp
(
x2
2aT − πG2(T − t)
)
,
where we have computed the expectation in a closed form for the second equality. One can quickly
verify that it satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 6 for a > G2π/2, hence qt(θ) = fˆt(‖θ‖) will be an
admissible relaxation. Thus, by Corollary 2, we immediately have
Regret(u) ≤ B∗(θT ) + ǫ
(
1− πG
2
2a
)− 1
2
,
and so by Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can state the following Theorem, that matches the lower
bound up to a constant multiplicative factor.
Theorem 11. Let a > G2π/2, and G = {g : ‖g‖ ≤ G}. Denote by θˆ = θ‖θ‖ if ‖θ‖ 6= 0, and ~0
otherwise. Fix the number of rounds T of the game, and consider the strategy
wt+1 = ǫθˆt
exp
(
(‖θt‖+G)2
2aT−piG2(T−t−1)
)
− exp
(
(‖θt‖−G)2
2aT−piG2(T−t−1)
)
2G
√
1− piG2(T−t−1)2aT
.
Then, for any sequence of linear costs {gt}Tt=1, and any u ∈ H, we have
Regret(u) ≤ ‖u‖
√√√√2aT log
(√
aT‖u‖
ǫ
+ 1
)
+ ǫ
((
1− πG
2
2a
)− 1
2
− 1
)
.
6.2 AdaptiveNormal: an adaptive algorithm for unknown T
Our techniques suggest the following recipe for developing adaptive algorithms: analyze the known T
case, define a potential qt(θ) ≈ VT (θ), and then analyze the incrementally-optimal algorithm for this
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potential (14) via Theorem 1. We follow this recipe in the current section. Again consider the game
where an adversary that plays from G = {g ∈ H | ‖g‖ ≤ G}. Define the function ft as
ft(x) = βt exp
( x
2at
)
,
where a > 3piG
2
4 , and the βt is a decreasing sequence that will be specified in the following. From
this, we define the potential qt(θ) = ft(‖θ‖2). Suppose we play the incrementally-optimal algorithm
of (14). Using Lemma 8 we can write the minimax value for the one-round game,
ǫt(θt) = E
r∼{−1,1}
[ft+1((‖θt‖+ rG)2)]− qt(θt)
≤ E
φ∼N(0,σ2)
[ft+1((‖θt‖+ φG)2)]− qt(θt) . Lemma 7.
Using Lemma 17 in the Appendix and our hypothesis on a, we have that the RHS of this inequality is
maximized for ‖θt‖ = 0. Hence, using the inequality
√
a+ b ≤ √a+ b
2
√
a
, ∀a, b > 0, we get
ǫt(θt) ≤ βt+1
√
1 +
πG2
2a (t+ 1)− πG2 − βt ≤
βt
2
πG2
2a (t+ 1)− πG2 ≤
πG2βt
4a t
.
Thus, choosing βt = ǫ/ log2(t + 1), for example, is sufficient to prove that ǫ1:T is bounded by
ǫpiG
2
a [Baxley, 1992]. Hence, again using Corollary 2 and Lemma 14 in the Appendix, we can state
the following Theorem.
Theorem 12. Let a > 3G2π/4, and G = {g : ‖g‖ ≤ G}. Denote by θˆ = θ‖θ‖ if ‖θ‖ 6= 0, and ~0
otherwise. Consider the strategy
wt+1 = ǫθˆt
(
exp
(
(‖θt‖+G)2
2a(t+ 1)
)
− exp
(
(‖θt‖ −G)2
2a(t+ 1)
))(
2G log2(t+ 2)
)−1
.
Then, for any sequence of linear costs {gt}Tt=1, and any u ∈ H, we have
Regret(u) ≤ ‖u‖
√√√√2aT log
(√
aT‖u‖ log2(T + 1)
ǫ
+ 1
)
+ ǫ
(
πG2
a
− 1
)
.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose the algorithm provides the reward guarantee (4). First, note that for any comparator
u, by definition we have
Regret(u) = −Reward−〈g1:T , u〉 . (21)
Then, applying the definitions of Reward, Regret, and the Fenchel conjugate, we have
Regret(u) = θT · u− Reward By (21)
≤ θT · u− qT (θT ) + ǫˆ1:T By assumption (4)
≤ max
θ
(
θ · u− qT (θ) + ǫˆ1:T
)
= q∗T (u) + ǫˆ1:T .
For the other direction, assuming (5), we have for any comparator u,
Reward = θT · u− Regret(u) By (21)
= max
v
(
θ · v − Regret(v))
≥ max
v
(
θ · v − q∗T (v)− ǫˆ1:T
)
By assumption (5)
= qT (θ) − ǫˆ1:T .
Alternatively, one can prove this from the Fenchel-Young inequality.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We have B∗(u) = supθ 〈u, θ〉 − f(‖θ‖). If ‖u‖ = 0, the stated equality is correct, in fact
B∗(u) = sup
θ
−f(‖θ‖) = sup
α≥0
−f(α) = sup
α∈R
−f(α) = f∗(0) .
Hence we can assume ‖u‖ 6= 0, and by inspection we can take θ = αu/‖u‖, with α ≥ 0, and so
B∗(u) = sup
α≥0
α‖u‖ − f(α) = sup
α∈R
α‖u‖ − f(α) = f∗(‖u‖) .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First we show that if f satisfies the condition on the derivatives, the same conditions is sat-
isfied by ft, for all t. We have that all the ft have the form h(x) = f(
√
x2 + a), where a ≥
0. Hence we have to prove that xh
′′(x)
h′(x) ≤ 1. We have that h′(x) = xf
′(
√
x2+a)√
x2+a
, and h′′(x) =
x2f ′′(
√
x2+a)+ a√
x2+a
f ′(
√
x2+a)
x2+a , so
xh′′(x)
h′(x)
=
x2f ′′(
√
x2 + a)
√
x2 + a
f ′(
√
x2 + a)(x2 + a)
+
a
x2 + a
≤ x
2
x2 + a
+
a
x2 + a
= 1,
where in the inequality we used the hypothesis on the derivatives of f .
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We show Vt has the stated form by induction from T down to 0. The base case for t = T is
immediate. For the induction step, we have
Vt(θ) = min
w
max
g
〈w, g〉+ Vt+1(θ − g) Defn.
= min
w
max
g
〈w, g〉+ ft+1 (‖θ − g‖) (IH)
= ft+1
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
Assumption (16)
= f
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2(T − t)
)
.
The sufficient condition for (16) follow immediately from Lemma 5.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First, we need to show the functions ft and fˆt of (18) are even. Let r be a random variable
draw from any symmetric distribution. Then, we have
ft(x) = E[f(|x+ r|)] = E[f(| − x− r|)] = E[f(| − x+ r|)] = ft(−x),
where we have used the fact that | · | is even and the symmetry of r.
We show ft(‖θ‖) = Vt(θ) inductively from t = T down to t = 0. The base case T = t follows
from the definition of ft. Then, suppose the result holds for t+ 1. We have
Vt(θ) = min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ Vt+1(θ − g) Defn.
= min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ ft+1(‖θ − g‖) IH
= E
r∼{−1,1}
[
ft+1(‖θ‖+ rG)
]
Lemma 8
= E
r∼{−1,1}
[
E
rτ−1∼{−1,1}τ−1
[
f(‖θ‖+ rG + rτ−1G)
]]
= ft(‖θ‖),
where the last two lines follow from the definition of ft and ft+1. The case for fˆt is similar, using the
hypothesis of the Theorem we have
min
w
max
g∈G
〈g, w〉+ fˆt+1(‖θ − g‖) = Er∼{−1,1}[fˆt+1(‖θ‖+ rG)] ≤ Er∼N(0,σ2)[fˆt+1(‖θ‖+ φG)]
= fˆt(‖θ‖),
where in the inequality we used Lemma 7, and in the second equality the definition of fˆt. Hence,
qt(θ) = fˆt(‖θ‖) satisfy (13) with ǫˆt = 0. Finally, the sufficient conditions come immediately from
Lemma 8.
A.5 Analysis of the one-round game: Proofs of Lemmas 5 and 8
In the process of proving these lemmas, we also show the following general lower bound:
Lemma 13. Under the same definitions as in Lemma 5, if d > 1, we have
H ≥ h
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
.
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We now proceed with the proofs. The d = 1 case for Lemma 8 was was proved in McMahan and
Abernethy [2013].
Before proving the other results, we simplify a bit the formulation of the minimax problem. For
the other results, the maximization wrt g of a convex function is always attained when ‖g‖ = G.
Moreover, in the case of ‖θ‖ = 0 the other results are true, in fact
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ h(‖θ − g‖) = min
w
max
‖g‖=G
〈w, g〉+ h(‖g‖) = min
w
G‖w‖ + h(G) = h(G) .
Hence, without loss of generality, in the following we can write w = α θ‖θ‖ + wˆ, where 〈wˆ, θ〉 = 0. It
is easy to see that in all the cases the optimal choice of g turns out to be g = β θ‖θ‖ + γwˆ, where γ ≥ 0.
With these settings, the minimax problem is equivalent to
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉 + h(‖θ − g‖) = min
α,wˆ
max
β2+‖wˆ‖2γ2=G2
αβ + γ‖wˆ‖2 + h(
√
‖θ‖2 − 2β‖θ‖+G2) .
By inspection, the player can always choose wˆ = 0 so γ‖wˆ‖2 = 0. Hence we have a simplified and
equivalent form of our optimization problem
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ h(‖θ − g‖) = min
α
max
β2≤G2
αβ + h(
√
‖θ‖2 − 2β‖θ‖+G2) . (22)
For Lemma 13, it is enough to set β = 0 in (22).
For Lemma 5, we upper bound the minimum wrt to α with the specific choice of α. In particular,
we set α = ‖θ‖√‖θ‖2+G2h
′
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
in (22), and get
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉+ h(‖θ − g‖) ≤ max
β2≤G2
β‖θ‖h′(
√
‖θ‖2 +G2)√
‖θ‖2 +G2 + h(
√
‖θ‖2 − 2β‖θ‖+G2) .
The derivative of argument of the max wrt β is
‖θ‖h′
(√
‖θ‖2 +G2
)
√
‖θ‖2 +G2 −
‖θ‖h′
(√
‖θ‖2 − 2β‖θ‖+G2
)
√
‖θ‖2 − 2β‖θ‖+G2 . (23)
We have that if β = 0 the first derivative is 0. Using the hypothesis on the first and second derivative
of h, we have that the second term in (23) increases in β. Hence β = 0 is the maximum. Comparing
the obtained upper bound with the lower bound in Lemma 13, we get the stated equality.
For Lemma 8, the second derivative wrt β of the argument of the minimax problem in (22) is
−‖θ‖
−‖θ‖h′′(
√
‖θ‖+G2 − 2β‖θ‖) + h′(
√
‖θ‖+G2 − 2β‖θ‖) ‖θ‖√‖θ‖+G2−2β‖θ‖
‖θ‖+G2 − 2β‖θ‖
that is non negative, for our hypothesis on the derivatives of h. Hence, the argument of the minimax
problem is convex wrt β, hence the maximum is achieved at the boundary of the domains, that is
β2 = G2. So, we have
min
w
max
g∈G
〈w, g〉 + h(‖θ − g‖) = max (−Gα+ h(‖θ‖+G), Gα + h(|‖θ‖ −G|)) .
The argmin of this quantity wrt to α is obtained when the the two terms in the max are equal, so we
obtained the stated equality.
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A.6 Lemma 14
Lemma 14. Define f(θ) = β exp ‖θ‖22α , for α, β > 0. Then
f∗(w) ≤ ‖w‖
√
2α log
(√
α‖w‖
β
+ 1
)
− β .
Proof. From the definition of Fenchel dual, we have
f∗(w) = max
θ
〈θ, w〉 − f(θ) ≤ 〈θ∗, w〉 − β .
where θ∗ = argmaxθ〈θ, w〉 − f(θ). We now use the fact that θ∗ satisfies w = ∇f(θ∗), that is
w = θ∗
β
α
exp
(‖θ∗‖2
2α
)
,
in other words we have that θ∗ and w are in the same direction. Hence we can set θ∗ = qw, so that
f∗(w) ≤ q‖w‖2 − β. We now need to look for q > 0, solving
qβ
α
exp
(‖w‖2q2
2α
)
= 1⇔ ‖w‖
2q2
2α
+ log
βq
α
= 0
⇔ q =
√
2α
‖w‖2 log
α
qβ
=
√√√√√ 2α‖w‖2 log

 √α‖w‖
β
√
2 log αqβ

 .
Using the elementary inequality log x ≤ me x
1
m , ∀m > 0, we have
q2 =
2α
‖w‖2 log
α
qβ
≤ 2mα
e‖w‖2
(
α
qβ
) 1
m
⇒ q 2m+1m ≤ 2mα
m+1
m
e‖w‖2β 1m ⇒ q ≤
(
2m
e‖w‖2
) m
2m+1
α
m+1
2m+1 β−
1
2m+1
⇒ α
βq
≥
(
e‖w‖2
2m
) m
2m+1
α1−
m+1
2m+1β
1
2m+1
−1 =
α
βq
≥
(√
e
2m
‖w‖√α
β
) 2m
2m+1
.
Hence we have
q ≤
√√√√√ 2α‖w‖2 log

 √α‖w‖
β
√
4m
2m+1 log
√
e
2m
‖w‖√α
β

 .
We set m such that
√
e
2m
‖w‖√α
β =
√
e, that is 12
(
‖w‖√α
β
)2
= m. Hence we have log
√
e
2m
‖w‖√α
β =
1
2 and
‖w‖√α
β√
2m
= 1, and obtain
f∗(w) ≤ ‖w‖
√√√√√2α log


√(√
α‖w‖
β
)2
+ 1

− β ≤ ‖w‖
√
2α log
(√
α‖w‖
β
+ 1
)
− β .
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A.7 Lemma 17
Lemma 15. Let f(x) = b exp
(
x2
a
)
− exp
(
x2
c
)
. If a ≥ c > 0, b ≥ 0, and b c ≤ a, then the function
f(x) is decreasing for x ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is immediate from the study of the first derivative.
Lemma 16. Let f(t) = a
3
2 t
√
t+1
(a (t+1)−b) 32
, with a ≥ 3/2b > 0. Then f(t) ≤ 1 for any t ≥ 0.
Proof. The sign of the first derivative of the function has the same sign of
(2 a− 3b)(t+ 1) + b,
hence from the hypothesis on a and b the function is strictly increasing. Moreover the asymptote for
t→∞ is 1, hence we have the stated upper bound.
Lemma 17. Let ft(x) = βt exp
(
x
2at
)
, βt+1 ≤ βt, ∀t. If a ≥ 3piG24 , then
argmax
x
E
φ∼N(0,σ2)
[ft+1(x+ φG)]− ft(x) = 0,
where σ2 = pi2 .
Proof. We have
E
φ∼N(0,σ2)
[ft+1(x+ φG)] = βt+1
√
a (t+ 1)
a (t+ 1)− σ2G2 exp
(
x2
2 [a (t+ 1)− σ2G2]
)
,
so we have to study the max of
βt+1
√
a (t+ 1)
a (t+ 1)− σ2G2 exp
(
x2
2 [a (t+ 1)− σ2G2]
)
− βt exp
(
x2
2 a t
)
.
The function is even, so we have a maximum in zero iff the function is decreasing for x > 0. Observe
that, from Lemma 16, for any t ≥ 0√
a (t+ 1)
a (t+ 1)− σ2G2
a t
a (t+ 1)− σ2G2 ≤ 1 .
Hence, using Lemma 15, we obtain that the stated result.
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